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SECURITY ASPECTS OF CHATTEL
LEASES IN BANKRUPTCY
RUSSELL L. HILLER*
D ESPITE some of its risks, the leasing of chattels appears to have a
growing attraction for the lessor and the prospective lessee. This
trend in the direction of a broader use of the lease transaction affecting
chattels is reflected in the increasing frequency of claims by alleged
lessors of such property to recover its possession from trustees in
bankruptcy.
Few, if any, problems are produced in bankruptcy by lease transac-
tions involving what are termed "true," "bona-fide" or "straight" leases.
These are leases calling for a rental for the "right to use" described
personal property for a specific term, where the rentals over the term
of the lease can be found to bear a reasonable relation to the average
loss in value of the leased property due to aging, wear and tear, and
obsolescence. The article involved is not usually available for outright
purchase. Generally speaking, these so-called "true leases" generate
little or no adversary action in insolvency proceedings.
The business of chattel leasing, however, is predominantly a financing
operation. Leases have become instruments designed to finance the pur-
chase of the leased article. For the prospective lessee, chattel leasing pro-
vides a method for capital expansion. The commitment of available funds
for the outright purchase of capital equipment may not be desirable for
the business at the time that the equipment is needed. In certain in-
stances, a business may require specialized equipment only for a limited
period of time or for a particular purpose. Likewise, the equipment
needed by a business may have a high risk of obsolescence, not only as
to the machine itself, but also as to the product that it produces. Finally,
certain businesses find it advantageous to lease, rather than purchase,
equipment because the rentals are chargeable as operating expense and,
thus, deductible business expenses for income tax purposes.'
From the standpoint of the lessor, the lease transaction also has certain
attractive advantages over installment selling. In a lease transaction,
the legal title to the leased article remains with the lessor. While the
article is in the lessee's possession, it is not subject to levy by the lessee's
creditors. Where several security interests are competing for the same
security collateral, the lessor is able to stay out of the conflict.2 Upon
* Referee in Bankruptcy, Eastern District of Pennsyl-ania.
1. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) (3).
2. For the rules governing the relative priority of competing security interests in the
came collateral, see Uniform Commercial Code § 9-312.
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default, the lessor usually finds it easier to recover possession of the
property from a lessee than to recover possession where the transaction
is a conventional security interest.
Leases of chattels often provide that the lessee may become the owner
of the leased article upon compliance with certain conditions. When lease
agreements depart from the conventional provisions that characterize
bona fide lease transactions by granting to the lessees rights or options
to acquire ownership of the leased property, these agreements begin to
take on "chameleon characteristics." 3 Since chattel leasing ordinarily in-
volves goods which the Uniform Commercial Code classifies as equip-
ment,4 the filing prescribed by section 9-401 of the Code" might be neces-
sary where the option-to-purchase provisions of the lease render the
transaction a security agreement. Because lessors ordinarily do not
support their lease transactions with filing of any kind, these transactions
are frequently attacked by bankruptcy trustees as unperfected security
interests. These transactions are vulnerable because the trustee in bank-
ruptcy is vested with the rights, remedies, and powers of a lien creditor
as to all the property upon which, at the date of bankruptcy, a creditor
of the bankrupt could have obtained a lien.' Furthermore, section
9-301 (1) (b) of the Code1 provides that an unperfected security inter-
est is subordinate to the rights of persons who become lien creditors
without knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. The
problem for the courts is, therefore, to determine at precisely what point
such purported lease transactions undergo the transition from a lease
to a sale.
The practice of casting contracts in the form of leases with options
to the lessee to purchase for a small consideration at the end of the term
where all the rent has been duly paid, or with express agreements that,
upon payment of all rents due under the lease, title to the leased property
vests in the lessee at the end of the term, renders such transactions leases
in name only. The so-called rents, in reality, are nothing other than pay-
ments of installments of the price. The Commissioners' note to Section 1
of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act declared that a lease is substan-
tially equivalent to a conditional sale "when the buyer is bound to pay
rent substantially equal to the value of the goods and has the option of
becoming or is to become the owner of the goods after all the rent is
paid."8
3. 4 Mertens, Federal Income Taxation § 25.109, at 316 (rev. ed. 1960).
4. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-109(2).
5. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-401.
6. Bankruptcy Act § 70c, 52 Stat. 880 (1938), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 110(c) (1964).
7. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-301 (1) (b).
8. Commissioners' Note, Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1.
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However, simply observing that the sum of the rentals substantially
approximates the price of the property does not of itself indicate that
the transaction is a sale or intended as security. Consideration of mere
arithmetic can yield only tentative and provisional conclusions. For a
lessor to engage in chattel leasing, he must, even in a true lease arrange-
ment, provide for aggregate rentals in single or successive leases that
at least equal the acquisition cost of the leased article, plus his costs
of doing business, a reasonable profit, less salvage at the end of the
useful economic life of the article. There must be more in evidence than
the substantial equivalence of the total rents and the value of the
leased article, in order to transform the lease into a sale or secured
transaction.
The security aspects of chattel leasing have been given rather oblique
treatment under the Uniform Commercial Code. Among the contractually
created security interests catalogued in section 9-102(2) 9 are leases
that are intended as security. But the substantive rules governing when
or whether a lease is one intended as security are made a part of the
definition of the term "security interest" in section 1-201(37).") It is
provided in that section that reservation of title in a lease is not a security
interest unless the lease is intended as security, and whether a lease is
intended as security is to be determined by the facts of each case." The
presence in a lease of an option to purchase does not of itself under the
Code render a lease one intended as security.' Thus, the intention of
the parties is made the polestar for determining whether a transaction
which in form purports to be a lease is, in fact, something else. This is
substantially a codification of what the judicially established law had
been prior to the advent of the Code. 3
The Code does, however, provide a definitive rule for determining when
a purported lease becomes a secured transaction. In section 1-201(37),
it is provided that an agreement in a lease that "upon compliance with
the terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become
the owner of the property for no additional consideration or for a nominal
consideration does make the lease one intended as security as a matter
of law." 4 This, too, is a recodification of prior statutory law.'3
9. Uniform Commercial Code § 9-102(2).
10. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(37).
11. Ibid.
12. Ibid.
13. See, e.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (Sth Cir. 1959);
Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956); Benton v. Com-
missioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cr. 1952); Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commi-ioner, 52 F.2d
120 (3d Cir. 1931).
14. Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201(37).
15. Uniform Conditional Sales Act § 1.
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Options to purchase that may be exercised in other ways can also
transform a lease into a security agreement. A lease agreement that con-
tains an option to purchase that is exercisable at any time (or at stated
intervals) during the term of the lease, and which gives credit towards
the purchase price of a substantial percentage of the aggregate of all
rentals already paid, is very likely to transform the purported lease into
a secured transaction. 6 Similarly, the presence of an option to purchase
in a lease may affect its legal character in cases where the lessee is build-
ing equity in the leased property by paying rentals higher than those
which would be charged as normal use charges.'
However, even the presence of an option to purchase in a lease will
not affect its legal character as a lease where the lessee also is given the
right to terminate or extend the term of the lease, or where no part of
the rentals already paid are applicable to the option purchase price.18
Likewise, its legal character as a lease will not be affected where the
option price was intended, and is found, to be a reasonable approximation
of the market value of the property leased at the end of any given period
when the option may be exercised, and where the rental charges were
intended, and are found, to fairly compensate the lessor for the loss in
value of the property over the term of the lease, due to aging, wear
and tear, and obsolescence. 9
The many variations of the option to purchase that are employed by
the inventive minds of the legal draftsmen who prepare chattel leases
render it inappropriate to attempt to catalogue them in a brief treatise.
Perhaps the broadest judicial treatment of leases has occurred in a line
of authoritative tax cases involving the tax consequences of chattel leases.
In those cases, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue repeatedly en-
deavored to persuade the courts to adopt an objective "economic test"
in analyzing the lease transaction to ascertain its true legal character.
The economic analysis test proceeds upon the theory that, if the rental
payments substantially equal the purchase price of the goods, and the
lessee has the option of purchasing the property for a nominal considera-
tion, then the agreement should be found to be a sale rather than a lease.
20
In 1955, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated Revenue Ruling
55-540, which provides:
Whether an agreement, which in form is a lease, is in substance a conditional sales
contract depends upon the intent of the parties as evidenced by the provisions of the
agreement, read in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time the agree-
16. In the Matter of Royer's Bakery, Inc. 56 Berks County L.J. (Pa.) 48 (1963).
17. Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1955).
18. See Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956).
19. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
20. See id. at 164.
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ment was executed. In ascertaining such intent no single test, or any special combina-
tion of tests, is absolutely determinative.2 1
However, the Government has urged and the Tax Court has repeatedly
held that, if the rents equal the purchase price and there is an option to
buy for a nominal amount, then it is conchsively established that the
parties intended a sale rather than a lease. ' 2 The rationale for this posi-
tion is apparently that the lessee is acquiring an equity in the property
and, therefore, his payments would not be deductible as rental expenses
under section 162 (a) (3) of the Code.23 Since they do not qualify as rents,
they, therefore, must be part of the purchase price. Thus, in Judson
Mills,'4 the court found that
it matters not whether the contract was in the form of a lease or a conditional sale,
or what was the intention of the parties; if, under the terms of the contracts by which
the payments were made, the [lesseel ... acquired an equity in the machinery...
the payments would not be deductible, due to the limitation prescribed in the code.23
Several appellate courts, while often agreeing in result, have disagreed
with the means used in arriving at the result." These courts have held
that this economic analysis test is only one of the factors to be used in
determining the intent of the parties, and that it alone should not con-
clusively establish intent. What the other factors might be depends
largely upon the particular circumstances of the case. Typically, some
other factors which would merit consideration are the conduct of the
parties, e.g., did the lessor report the income received as ordinary income:
whether there is a right of repossession on default or bankruptcy; and
the reasonableness of the rent as compared with the rentals of similar
items in the same general area." Although we limit ourselves here to a
consideration of the security aspects of chattel leasing, these tax cases
are informative as to the method that the courts employ to learn the
true character of the agreements.
One of the more carefully considered decisions involving the tax con-
sequences of a leasing program undertaken by a manufacturer of
machines is Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Unilcd States,- decided in 1961.
In that case, the court considered the Government's proposed objective
21. Rev. Rul. 55-540, 1955-2 Cum. Bull. 39, 41.
22. See, e.g., Truman Bowen, 12 T.C. 446 (1949); Judson Mill, 11 T.C. 25 (194S).
23. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a)(3) (formerly Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 23(a)(1)(A),
as amended, 66 Stat. 443 (1952)).
24. 11 T.C. 25 (1943).
25. Id. at 32. (Emphasis added.)
26. E.g., Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956);
Oesterreich v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 79S (9th Cir. 1955).
27. See Newlin, Leasing Industrial Mlachinery-Some Tax Problems of the Lecee, 33
Taxes 138, 141 (1955).
28. 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. is. 1961).
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economic analysis and rejected it. The manufacturer, who had previously
sold its machines on outright sales or under installment arrangements by
use of chattel mortgage or conditional sales agreements, set up a leasing
program after careful study.2" The leases it offered to prospective cus-
tomer-lessees were for seven-year terms at scaled periodic rentals. A
choice of three options to purchase were available to the lessee; the
lessee also had the option to terminate the lease at specified intervals.
In its tax returns, the lessor treated the rentals as ordinary income, while
deducting depreciation on the leased machines. Finding that the rental
charges spread over the first three years of the leases aggregated approxi-
mately seventy-five per cent of the list price of the machines, the Govern-
ment contended that the agreements were, in reality, conditional sales
since, during the first three years, the lessees were acquiring an equity
through their payment of rentals. The court observed that the rentals
alone did not necessarily indicate that a portion of such rentals were
actually payments on an installment sale, especially where it had not been
shown that such rentals, though high, were unreasonable 0  The court
was able to find from the evidence that the rentals were fixed at the
higher rate during the early years of the lease because the rate of de-
preciation was higher during those years' Additionally, the court found
that
the option prices [under all three option plans] were intended to be and were rea-
sonably close approximations of the market value of the machines at the end of any
given number of years [and] . . . that the rental charges were intended . . . and did
sufficiently compensate the [lessor] . . . for the average loss in value [of the leased
article] over the term of the lease attributable to aging, wear and tear, and
obsolescence.3 2
Furthermore, the Government had produced no evidence in support of
its contention of the lessee's alleged equity in the machines by showing
that the option prices were so low when compared to market value as
to indicate that the lessees had acquired an equity when exercising their
options to purchase." After examining all the economic factors pointed
29. "This determination [to install a lease program] was reached after noting that the
average price of milling machines had risen from $10,000 to $20,000 between 1940 and 1950,
that many customers wanted to try out the machines in their own plants before purchasing,
that technological advances gave rise to a desire on the part of customers to avoid the risk
of obsolescence, both of the machines and the product for the manufacture of which it was
used, by shifting it to the manufacturer, and that many customers needed a specific machine
for work of a definite duration or performance of one contract and would have no need for
it thereafter." Id. at 159.
30. Id. at 163.
31. Ibid.




out by the Government, the court held that the character of the trans-
action was to be determined, among other things, by the intention of
the parties as ascertained from the agreement and the surrounding cir-
cumstances existing at the time that it was made34
In Benton v. Coinnzissioner,35 the court also rejected the objective
economic approach to a determination of the character of the agree-
ment. The court held that the economic relation of the value of the prop-
erty to the option price was only one factor to be considered when ascer-
taining the intent of the parties," and that factor was to be examined
not at the time when the option was exercised, but, rather, in the light
of the facts and circumstances that existed at the time that the parties
entered into the contract.
In a recent Fourth Circuit case,37 the respective contentions of the
taxpayer and the Government were the reverse of what they usually are.
The taxpayer had treated the series of payments which he received under
an agreement for the sale of a group of theaters as a sale of capital
assets; the Government contended that the payments were rentals re-
ceived pursuant to a lease agreement. In holding that the transaction
was a sale, the court declared that the character of the transaction was to
be ascertained by looking at the substance of the transaction and not at
the label placed upon the transaction by the parties' s The true nature
of a transaction, said the court, was "to be determined by looking at all of
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction.""0 In instances
34. It had been noted earlier by the court that, although certain decisions had based
determination as to the nature of each particular transaction on the intent of the parties,
"the plaintiff and defendant have agreed that the determination here be made on the basis
of the lease program as a whole and not on the basis of a consideration of each of the 87
separate transactions." Id. at 160. The court found substantial similarity between the case
before it and Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commissioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956), upon
which it relied heavily. The Breece court was impressed by the fact that, after the termination
of-the "lease," the taxpayer had to pay a substantial sum before he could become the owner.
Id. at 322, 324; see cases cited note 46 infra and accompanying text.
35. 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952).
36. The court noted that the Tax Court, in finding that the agreement was a conditional
sale, erroneously stated: "'If the value of the property here was less than the option price,
then petitioners acquired no equity in the property. The converse of this, however, is true,
and if its value or market price exceeded, or materially exceeded the option price, then it
would appear that petitioners did have an equity therein.. . .We find that petitioner did
acquire and have an equity in the property, which fact alone is determinative of the issue
here."' Id. at 751-52. The court disagreed and reasoned that, if the parties intended to enter
into a lease contract, the lessee did not acquire any equity in the property until he exercised
his option to purchase. Id. at 752.
37. Meiselman v. Commissioner, 300 F.2d 666 (4th Cir. 1962).
38. Id. at 66S.
39. Ibid.
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where no evidence is submitted bearing upon the intent of the parties to
an agreement, their intent must be gathered from the writing itself.4"
In Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner,41 a construction con-
tractor requiring heavy equipment for a large project obtained 123 units,
most of them new, from dealers upon leases for terms ranging from seven
to twenty-eight months. None of the leases contained an option to pur-
chase the equipment, nor were there any side agreements regarding pur-
chase. At the end of their respective lease terms, thirty pieces were
returned to the lessors; the contractor purchased the remaining ninety-
three units at the end of their respective lease terms. Upon execution of
the separate leases, it was the practice for the dealer-lessor to procure a
loan from a bank in an amount substantially equal to the acquisition cost
of the equipment by giving the bank its note and a chattel mortgage. At
the same time, the dealer would also assign to the bank its lease with the
contractor, who thereafter made his rental payments directly to the bank.
When the contractor indicated a desire to purchase the equipment, the
dealers arrived at the amounts that they would accept as "end payments,"
by taking their list prices, adding their financing costs, and deducting
therefrom all rentals paid by the contractor. In this setting, the Govern-
ment disallowed the rent payments as deductible business expenses. How-
ever, the court found the agreements to be lease agreements, which was
what they purported to be at the time that the agreements were entered
into. The transaction was not to be judged by what the parties later de-
cided or agreed to do.
42
40. Jefferson Gas Coal Co. v. Commissioner, 52 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1931). "ET~he real
character of an instrument must be determined from the intention of the parties as gathered
from a fair interpretation of the instrument as a whole." Id. at 122.
41. 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959).
42. The Tax Court, in looking beyond the face of the leases, had considered the eco-
nomic factors involved and had deduced the legal conclusion that the dealer and the con-
tractor had intended a sale at the time of the agreements. Id. at 699. In rejecting this con-
clusion, which had the effect of reading an implied option or agreement into the leases, thus
providing the contractor with a right to buy the equipment, the court of appeals stressed
that the leases did not purport to transfer title nor did they obligate the dealers to tranfer
title at some time in the future. Id. a 699-700. "The absence of either an option clause
or a stipulation providing that upon payment of the stipulated rent title would vest
in [the contractor] . . . is likewise fatal to a contention that the instruments upon
their face have the characteristics of a conditional sales contract." Id. at 700-01. While
noting that "a mere mechanical application of economic factors is erroneous . . ."
without consideration of other circumstances, id. at 702 n.10, the court stated: "In a
proper case, the economic factors of the situation may be important in interpreting
an agreement, and in arriving at the intent of the parties, but there is no legal basis
here for holding . . . that such factors and circumstances can make a new agreement
for the parties. . . . It simply does not follow that because [the contractor] ...ultimately
acquired all 93 pieces of equipment, it therefore had the legal right to so acquire them. ...
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In Oesterreick v. Commissioner," the parties regarded their agreement
as a lease and treated the payments as rental income and rental expense,
respectively, in their tax returns. In holding the agreement to be a contract
of sale, the court observed that the test was not what the parties called
the transaction, nor even what they mistakenly believed to be the name
of such transaction, but, instead, what the parties believed the legal effect
of the transaction to be.44 It further held that, where the parties entered
into a transaction which they honestly believed to be a lease, but which
in actuality had all the elements of a contract of sale," it was a sale not
a lease, no matter what they called it or how they treated it in their
books.
These appellate cases cannot and should not be taken to imply that
the economic analysis test cannot receive paramount consideration under
any circumstances. It will be determinative of the result in cases where
the amount paid for the "purchase" at the termination of the lease is
disproportionately low. In all of the cases discussed above, where the
courts, in finding that the agreements were leases rather than sales, re-
fused to sanction the application of the economic analysis test as the sole
criterion, the amounts paid for the property were generally substantial4 0
Under Section 1-201(37) of the Uniform Commercial Code, it appears
that the economic analysis test would also be applicable in bankruptcy
cases in those situations where the option to purchase can be exercised
An interpretation of a contract cannot be stretched to that length." Id. at 701-02. (Emphasis
omitted.) (Footnote omitted.) Since no right existed prior to the actual sale, there was,
therefore, no basis to conclude that the contractor had acquired an equity in the property
prior to the purchase. Id. at 702.
43. 226 F.2d 793 (9th Cir. 1955).
44. Id. at S01.
45. Although the presence of an option will not, by itself, indicate that the leczzee was
building an equity, see 4 Mertens, op. cit. supra note 3, § 25.109, at 316-17, where there
is no doubt that this option ill be exercised, the court will find that the agreement was a
sale. Thus, in Oesterreich, the court stated: "It is clear that it was intended that title to the
premises was to pass to lessee at the end of the 63 year term. ... Therefore, if the only
test in determining whether it was a sale or lease was the passing of title, the parties in-
tended a sale and not lease." 226 F.2d at S02. The court found that the options would
without a doubt be exercised, since the lessee could acquire title at the expiration of the
lease for a mere $10. The Oesterreich court then distinguished several cases which had held
that presence of an option wvll not turn the lease into a contract for sale, on the grounds
that in those cases, "the option price constituted full consideration for the premises or goods
acquired," id. at S02-03, and that it was questionable whether these options would be emer-
cised. Ibid.
46. See Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (Sth Cir. 1959);
Benton v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1952); Kearnev & Trecler Corp. v. United
States, 195 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Mis. 1961). See also Breece Veneer & Panel Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 232 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1956).
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for little or no consideration.47 Thus, the few bankruptcy cases vhich
have dealt with the security aspects of lease agreements are not in con-
flict with the tax cases just summarized. In In the Matter of Crown Cart-
ridge Corp.,48 Referee Herzog of the Southern District of New York,
whose decision was affirmed by the district court, had disallowed an
alleged lessor's application to recover certain machinery, on the ground
that the purported lease agreement, by its terms, amounted to an unre-
corded conditional sales contract. The agreement was a sixty-month lease
with rentals on a sliding scale. After about two-thirds of the rentals had
been paid, the lessee defaulted. Under the terms of a separate agreement
executed simultaneously with the principal lease agreement, the lessee had
the option to purchase the "leased" property at the end of the term at ten
per cent of the list price shown in the lease. Neither the lease agreement
nor the option to purchase were recorded. The referee found the list price
to be 45,000 dollars and the fair market value of the leased property at
the conclusion of the lease to be 24,000 dollars. He concluded that the
option price of 4,500 dollars was nominal in relation to fair market value:"'
To the same effect is First Nat'l Bank v. Phillips,"° which affirmed the
holding of the referee in bankruptcy who had denied a petition to reclaim
property allegedly leased to the bankrupt under the terms of an "equip-
ment rental agreement." The referee decided that the agreement, by its
terms, constituted a conditional sale which, being unrecorded, was void
as to the trustee.
In In the Matter of Royer's Bakery, Inc.,"' certain machinery was
delivered to the bankrupt company under the terms of an unfiled written
lease agreement. The term of the lease was thirty-five months, and the
lessee was given the privilege of returning the equipment, upon thirty
days' prior notice, without further obligation except the payment of all
amounts due at the date of return. The lease was renewable. However,
the lessee also had the option to purchase the leased equipment at any
time during the term of the lease or renewal thereof upon payment of
the list price, "less 80% of the aggregate rental payments previously
made, up to but not exceeding, the list price of the equipment so pur-
47. See text accompanying notes 14 & 15 supra.
48. 220 F. Supp. 914 (S.DXN.Y. 1962).
49. The court observed that the purchase price was "patently out of proportion to the
market value of the goods," and that the sale, therefore, tended "to create an inference that
the 'lease' [was] . . . a device for camouflaging what is in all essential respects a condi-
tional sales contract under New York law." Id. at 917.
50. 261 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1958).
51. 56 Berks County L.J. (Pa.) 48 (1963).
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chased."" - The referee found the option to purchase in the lease a device
for financing the purchase and held the lease to be an unperfected security
interest for lack of filing.
In Matter of Larr Optics & Electronics Co.,"3 the lease of equipment
contained an option to purchase whereby, upon payment of all rentals
for the entire term of the lease, the lessee became entitled to a bill of sale
upon its payment of a sum amounting to slightly more than two months'
rent. The lease was for sixty months. The referee found that the rentals
were unrelated to the use of the property, that the total rentals for sixty
months were a fixed obligation of the lessee-bankrupt, and that the reser-
vation of title in the purported lessor was nothing more than a device to
secure that fixed obligation.
In Matter of Transcontinental Indus., Inc.,"4 the trustee challenged
the validity of the purported equipment leases, wherein the bankrupt was
the lessee, as being unperfected security financing agreements. After ex-
amining the circumstances under which the leases were entered into, the
referee found that it was the intention of the parties and the purpose
of the agreements to accomplish a purchase of the equipment under se-
curity financing arrangements which the parties fashioned in terms of
a lease.
Most of the reported cases dealing with equipment leases have been
concerned with situations growing out of proceedings involving the debtor-
lessee. But there is opportunity for situations involving the lessor as
well. It is not uncommon for lessors to finance the purchase of machinery
and equipment which becomes the subject matter in lease agreements
with their customers. When they do, the lease agreements may become
part of the lenders' collateral.
In the leasing industry, lending institutions play an important role.
This is so because lessors require substantial amounts of capital funds
to finance their acquisitions. In states where the Uniform Commercial
Code is in effect, this financing may be accomplished by using the lease
as collateral. When combined with the note obligations of the lessor, the
assigned lease constitutes chattel paper in the hands of the lending in-
stitution within the meaning of section 9-105(1)(b) of the Code. Its
status as chattel paper is not affected by the problem of whether the lease
is a true lease or one intended by the lessor and lessee as security. Where,
however, the lease is one intended for security, some complex questions
52. Ibid.
53. No. 41475, D. Colo., Jan. 1966, digested in 40 ReL J. 25 (1966).
54. No. 51115, N-D. Ga., Jan. 1966, digested in 40 Ref. J. 25 (1966).
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in priorities among conflicting security interests can evolve between
creditors of both the lessor and the lessee."
It will be some time before the law relating to the security aspects of
chattel leasing is developed sufficiently to provide the relative certainty
that is so badly needed in this small corner of personal property law.
55. See note 2 supra.
